The Court of Appeal’s first comprehensive interpretation of Article 33 UPCA
I. Introduction
On June 22, 2026, the Court of Appeal (CoA) delivered two important orders in Valeo v Bosch and Bosch v Valeo (UPC-CoA-4/2026 and UPC-CoA-13/2026; UPC-CoA-50/2026), providing its first comprehensive interpretation of Article 33(1) of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court („UPCA“). The orders address several of the most significant jurisdictional questions that have emerged since the UPC became operational: under what circumstances may infringement proceedings against multiple defendants, including defendants established outside the territory of the UPC, be jointly sued, in particular jointly sued before the Central Division?
The CoA rejected the restrictive interpretation previously adopted by the Central Division (Paris seat) and instead endorsed a purposive reading of Article 33 UPCA that promotes procedural economy and avoids fragmented litigation. In doing so, it substantially increases the procedural flexibility available to patentees litigating against several entities belonging to multinational corporate groups. The orders also provide important guidance on the meaning of the requirements of a „commercial relationship“ and „the same alleged infringement“ under Article 33(1)(b) UPCA.
Although the orders concern preliminary objections under Rule 19 RoP, their significance extends well beyond the procedural context. They clarify fundamental principles governing the allocation of jurisdiction within the UPC and are significant for future multi-defendant actions.
II. Background
Valeo brought an infringement action before the Central Division (Paris seat) against six international Bosch entities. Four defendants were domiciled in UPC Contracting Member States (also referred to as UPC territory), namely in France, Germany and Belgium, while two defendants were established outside the UPC territory, namely in Serbia and China. The action alleged infringement of European Patent EP 2 671 766 across multiple jurisdictions.
Bosch raised preliminary objections challenging the jurisdiction of the Central Division under Rule 19 RoP. The Central Division (Paris seat) upheld those objections in part.
In its first order, it concluded that Article 33(1), third subparagraph, UPCA, applied only where all defendants lacked domicile or establishment within the UPC territory. Consequently, proceedings against the four UPC territory-based defendants were transferred to the Local Division Düsseldorf. In its second order, the Central Division (Paris seat) held that Bosch Serbia lacked a sufficient commercial relationship with the remaining defendants, whereas proceedings against Bosch China could remain before the Central Division. Valeo appealed both orders.
III. Article 33 UPCA
The CoA states in its order UPC-CoA-4/2026 and UPC-CoA-13/2026 that Article 33 UPCA concerns the jurisdiction of the divisions of the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) and sets forth the rules governing the internal jurisdiction of the CFI’s divisions. Unlike the international jurisdiction of the Court, which, according to Article 31 UPCA, is established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 (Brussels I Recast Regulation) or, where applicable, on the basis of the Lugano Convention, the jurisdiction of the divisions of the CFI is determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 UPCA. The jurisdiction of the divisions of the CFI is an internal matter of the UPC, and Article 33 UPCA subject to autonomous interpretation (paragraph 15).
The CoA thus expressly recalls that Article 33 UPCA constitutes an autonomous rule governing the internal organization of the UPC rather than a rule of international jurisdiction. This distinction is critical.
IV. The third subparagraph of Article 33(1) UPCA creates an autonomous, alternative jurisdictional basis
The principal issue before the CoA was whether Article 33(1) UPCA, third subparagraph, merely creates an exception or instead establishes an autonomous, alternative jurisdictional rule.
The CoA unequivocally adopts the latter interpretation. Paragraphs 16 to 22 of the order UPC-CoA-4/2026 and UPC-CoA-13/2026 contain the central reasoning. The CoA identifies three distinct scenarios:
- The first scenario, under Article 33(1)(b) UPCA, confers jurisdiction on the Local Division of the Contracting Member State in which the defendant, or, where there are several defendants (subject to the additional conditions applicable in cases involving multiple defendants), one of the defendants, has its residence, principal place of business, or, failing that, its place of business, or on the Regional Division in which that Contracting Member State participates.
- The second scenario provided for in Article 33(1) UPCA is where the defendant’s residence or (principal) place of business is located outside the territory of the Contracting Member States.In that case, unless the claimant chooses to bring the action before the division having jurisdiction on the basis of the place where the infringement (or threatened infringement) occurred (Article 33(1)(a) UPCA), since the defendant is domiciled outside the territory of a Contracting Member State and there is therefore no Local or Regional Division attached to the state of the defendant’s domicile, the Central Division has jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Article 33(1) UPCA, just as a Local or Regional Division would have had jurisdiction if the defendant had been domiciled in a Contracting Member State.
Contrary to the first contested order and to Bosch’s submissions, the CoA finds, the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 33(1) UPCA do not constitute an exception to the jurisdiction of the Local and Regional Divisions to hear infringement actions under Article 33(1)(a) and (b) UPCA.
Neither the wording of that provision – which contains no limitation on the jurisdiction of the Central Division in respect of defendants established outside the territory of the Contracting Member States – nor its placement within Article 33(1) UPCA, immediately following the provisions governing the jurisdiction of the Local and Regional Divisions, supports the view that, for defendants established outside the territory of the Contracting Member States, the jurisdiction of the Central Division should be interpreted as merely an exception to the jurisdiction of the Local or Regional Divisions.
- Finally, in the third scenario, where the defendant’s residence or (principal) place of business is located in a Contracting Member State that has neither a Local Division nor participates in a Regional Division, the Central Division has jurisdiction under the defendant’s domicile criterion pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Article 33(1) UPCA, just as a Local or Regional Division would have had jurisdiction if the defendant had been domiciled in a Contracting Member State that hosted a Local Division or participated in a Regional Division.
V. Defendant-by-defendant assessment
One particularly important aspect of the order UPC-CoA-4/2026 and UPC-CoA-13/2026 concerns the methodology for assessing domicile. The Central Division had effectively considered the defendants collectively. The CoA rejects that approach. Paragraphs 23–32 of that order make clear that domicile must be assessed individually for each defendant. Once a single defendant falls outside the UPC territory and no local division has jurisdiction over that defendant, the third subparagraph becomes capable of applying.
This interpretation avoids artificial distinctions depending solely upon whether additional defendants happen to be established within the UPC.
The CoA is answering the practical question: what happens if there are several defendants and at least one of them cannot be allocated to a Local or Regional Division because it is either outside the UPC territory or in a Contracting Member State without a Local/Regional Division?
As a starting point, under the defendant’s domicile criterion, jurisdiction is determined by reference to the domicile, principal place of business or, failing that, the place of business of one of the defendants, the so-called „anchor defendant“. The action may therefore be brought before the Local or Regional Division linked to that defendant, provided that the defendants are commercially connected and the action concerns the same alleged infringement. According to the CoA, this mechanism is intended to avoid parallel proceedings before different UPC divisions and the resulting risk of inconsistent decisions.
The CoA further holds that the same objective applies where one or more co-defendants are not connected to any Local or Regional Division. First, where one of the defendants is domiciled in a Contracting Member State that neither hosts a Local Division nor participates in a Regional Division, the Central Division may hear the action against all defendants, provided the conditions for joinder under Article 33(1)(b) UPCA are fulfilled. The CoA rejects any interpretation that would require proceedings to be split merely because another defendant is domiciled in a Member State with a competent Local or Regional Division.
Secondly, the CoA reaches the same conclusion where one or more defendants are domiciled outside the territory of the UPC Contracting Member States. In such circumstances, the Central Division may likewise exercise jurisdiction over all commercially connected co-defendants accused of the same infringement. The CoA reasons that requiring the claimant to proceed only before the Local or Regional Division having jurisdiction over the UPC-domiciled defendants would undermine the purpose of Article 33(1) UPCA, third paragraph, which expressly provides for the jurisdiction of the Central Division where no Local or Regional Division is available in respect of one of the defendants.
The order UPC-CoA-4/2026 and UPC-CoA-13/2026 therefore confirms that the Central Division is not merely a residual forum for defendants outside the UPC territory or in Contracting Member States without a Local or Regional Division. Rather, it may function as a consolidating forum in multi-defendant litigation whenever one of the defendants falls within Article 33(1) UPCA, third or fourth subparagraph, thereby enabling all commercially connected defendants alleged to have committed the same infringement to be sued in a single UPC action.
Finally, the CoA rejects the argument that this interpretation is inconsistent with the principle of proximity. It observes that proximity is traditionally a principle governing the allocation of international jurisdiction between different national courts, whereas Article 33 UPCA concerns the internal allocation of cases within a single court system.
VI. Procedural economy as an interpretative principle
Perhaps one of the most striking features of the order is the CoA’s reliance upon procedural economy. Rather than treating efficiency merely as a policy consideration, the CoA uses it as an interpretative principle. Paragraphs 28–32 of the order UPC-CoA-4/2026 and UPC-CoA-13/2026 explain that Bosch’s interpretation would force claimants to litigate identical infringement issues before several UPC divisions. Such fragmentation would undermine one of the central objectives of the UPCA.
This reasoning might reflect a broader tendency already visible in recent UPC jurisprudence, where the CoA increasingly interprets procedural provisions in light of the UPC’s objective of delivering efficient pan-European patent litigation.
VII. The “commercial relationship” threshold and criterion
The CoA’s analysis suggests that the threshold for establishing a commercial relationship under Article 33(1)(b) UPCA is relatively modest during preliminary objection stage. Paragraphs 34–38 of the order UPC-CoA-4/2026 and UPC-CoA-13/2026 repeatedly stress that preliminary objection proceedings (Rule 19 RoP) require a summary assessment. It is said that in preliminary objection proceedings, the determination of a division’s jurisdiction should not be based on an exhaustive assessment of the evidence relating to disputed facts that are relevant both to jurisdiction and to the merits of the infringement claim, since such an assessment would improperly prejudge the outcome of the case on the merits. In such circumstances, the CoA finds, the Court must confine itself to a summary examination of the parties‘ submissions and the evidence before it.
The practical consequence is significant. Future defendants may find it considerably more difficult to defeat jurisdiction merely by disputing factual allegations concerning commercial relationships.
In the order UPC-CoA 50/2026, the CoA defines the „commercial relationship“ requirement under Article 33(1)(b) UPCA as requiring a commercial connection between the defendants in relation to the allegedly infringing product or product line. Such activities may include research and development, manufacturing, sales, or distribution. The CoA adopts a broad interpretation of the commercial relationship requirement. A commercial relationship may be either direct or indirect and may arise through intermediate group companies or even independent third parties. The decisive criterion is whether all defendants pursue the same commercial objective in relation to the allegedly infringing product or product line. The CoA expressly rejects the need for all defendants to participate in the same supply chain or for the anchor defendant to be involved in the various supply chains.
The CoA further clarifies that membership of the same corporate group may satisfy this requirement, provided that the activities of each group company concerned are linked to the allegedly infringing product or product line. This makes clear that group membership alone is not sufficient; rather, there must be a product-specific commercial nexus between each defendant and the alleged infringement.
VIII. „Same alleged infringement“
Paragraphs 39–41 of the order UPC-CoA-4/2026 and UPC-CoA-13/2026 indicate that requirement of the “same alleged infringement” concerns the existence of a common infringement allegation involving the same patent. Differences concerning individual products, territorial markets or particular infringing acts are matters for the merits rather than jurisdiction.
In the order UPC-CoA-50/2026, the CoA holds that the alleged infringing acts must relate to the same patent and the same product or product line. At the preliminary objection stage, a summary assessment is, according to the CoA, sufficient to establish that the products are substantially the same. Neither differences in commercial names nor the existence of separate supply and distribution channels preclude a finding that the action concerns the same alleged infringement.
This interpretation should substantially facilitate consolidated proceedings involving multinational manufacturing and distribution chains.
IX. Practical consequences
Beyond clarifying the interpretation of Article 33 UPCA, the CoA’s orders are likely to influence litigation strategy before the UPC.
Most importantly, the orders broaden the circumstances in which patentees may bring a single infringement action before the Central Division against entities of a multinational group comprising both UPC-based and non-UPC defendants. By rejecting a restrictive interpretation of Article 33 UPCA, the CoA has expanded the procedural options available to claimants seeking to avoid parallel proceedings and inconsistent decisions.
The orders also highlight the importance of carefully analyzing the defendant structure before commencing proceedings. Where, e.g., a non-UPC manufacturer, a UPC-based importer and national distribution companies are involved in the same alleged infringement, a consolidated action may now be possible before the Central Division. As a result, pre-litigation investigations into corporate structures, supply chains and commercial relationships will become even more significant.
From a pleading perspective, the orders underline that the „commercial relationship“ requirement must be supported by sufficiently detailed factual allegations. While the CoA confirmed that only a prima facie assessment is required at the Rule 19 stage, claimants should nevertheless explain the respective roles of the defendants within the allegedly infringing commercial chain. Conversely, defendants will find it more difficult to defeat jurisdiction through preliminary objections where the claimant has presented facts of those relationships.
Finally, the orders reinforce the CoA’s preference for interpreting the UPCA in a manner that promotes procedural economy and coherent dispute resolution.
X. Conclusion
The CoA’s orders in Valeo v Bosch mark an important step in the development of UPC jurisdictional law. The orders are likely to contain the leading principles on multi-defendant jurisdiction under the UPCA and will shape litigation strategy in cross-border patent disputes in the future.